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Abstract 
 
At the street level of the state public policies get their final form and substance. This 
being so, discretion is a key concept. The goal of this article is to specify discretion as 
a research object in the study of street-level bureaucracy. Therefore the theoretical 
views on discretion prevalent in juridical and other disciplines are explored. 
Discretion appears to be a multi-faceted concept. This finding has consequences for 
the analysis of discretion in the explanation of what happens in street-level 
bureaucracies.  
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1. Introduction 
 
‘When we have doubts about a file, we talk amongst ourselves. Before we go and see 
a manager, we ask each other: What would you do?’  
 
Dubois (2010, p. 150) quotes this respondent to illustrate how an employee of a 
French welfare office uses his or her discretion when settling a difficult case. For a 
number of reasons the statement of this person working in public service is 
interesting. First, it indicates the possibility of individual variation: not all employees 
of the welfare office concerned may consult their colleagues in a similar way. Second, 
organizational variation may be expected. The same task may be differently fulfilled, 
due to the varying characteristics of the agencies involved. Even welfare offices 
implementing the same kind of social security laws can be structured in different 
ways, while management and organizational culture may vary as well. Third, there 
may be variation at the scale of systems as a whole. The ways in which similar tasks, 
in this case, the provision of welfare benefits, are institutionally embedded, may vary 
along cross-national lines. While welfare benefits seem an inherent feature of welfare 
states, in France the provision of such benefits will be shaped differently from the 
way they are in Germany or the United Kingdom – although all members of the 
European Union. 
 
Hence the research issue of generalization is on the table. There are reasons to expect 
that the practiced peer review observable in the quote above, describes a ‘universal’ 
phenomenon as induced by street-level discretion which can be assumed to be 
inherent in policy implementation as such. However, the assumption tells us little 
about the frequency of peer review and the nature of its results. This goes even more 
for the degree to which those who have formulated and decided upon the public 
policy involved, have left freedom of judgement to those who are deemed to 
implement it. 
 
Opening the ‘black box’ of what happens at the ground floor of the state Lipsky 
(1980) coined the term street-level bureaucracy. He found that, rather than in the 
political-administrative centre, ‘public policy (..) in important ways (..) is actually 
made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers’ (Lipsky 
1980, p. xii). With the latter term he refers to individuals who work in ‘public 
services’ like ‘schools, police and welfare departments, lower courts, legal services 
offices’ and who ‘interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of 
benefits or the allocation of public sanctions’ (ibid., p. xi). An important element 
Lipsky deems inherent to the work of street-level bureaucrats is the presence of 
discretion. ‘Policy makers and economists might wish it were otherwise, but it seems 
clear that in the implementation of social welfare programs there remains an 
irreducible extent to which worker discretion cannot be eradicated’ (ibid., p. 28).  
 
In the 30th anniversary expanded edition of his book Lipsky (2010, p. xix) adds that he 
wants to ‘identify the common elements of occupations as apparently disparate as, 
say, police officer and social worker’. This ‘essentially comparative approach’ 
enables us ‘to raise questions systematically about apparent differences in various 
service areas’ (ibid.). Since Lipsky’s book was published a range of empirical studies 
on street-level bureaucracy have been carried out; for overviews of the state of the 
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field, see Maynard-Moody and Portillo 2010; Smith 2011; Brodkin 2012; Meyers and 
Lehmann Nielsen 2012. In most of those studies discretion, one way or another, is a 
key concept. It often figures as a more or less broadly defined label under which 
aspects of bureaucratic practice at the street level get attention.  
 
When the study of street-level bureaucracy is conceived as comparative research, and 
therefore the issue of generalization is at stake, there is a need to differentiate between 
what needs explanation and what may be seen as potentially explanatory factors, 
using explicit ceteris paribus clauses. First and foremost the programmatic aim of 
comparison implies the specification of the object of street-level bureaucracy 
research. Authors have attempted reviews of the literature on discretion (see, for 
example, chapters 12 and 13 in Hill 2013). Seldom, however, has comparing and 
contrasting the varying approaches to the concept been the explicit, singular, 
objective. Therefore specifying discretion as such is the goal in this article.  
 
Given this objective it seems useful to take a closer look at the ways the concept of 
discretion is viewed in law and other academic disciplines. After all, scholars in those 
disciplines may use different vocabularies, but in fact they, too, are interested in the 
empirical phenomena which the concept refers to. An exploration of such theoretical 
views may provide insights useful for street-level bureaucracy research. Hence the 
central question in this article is: When the study of street-level bureaucracy is 
conceived as comparative research, how is ‘discretion’ theoretically viewed in the 
various disciplinary literatures, and what consequences can be drawn from these 
views for the treatment of discretion in street-level bureaucracy research?  
 
First an exploration will follow of the ways in which the concept of discretion is 
viewed in the theoretical literatures on law and in other disciplines. Subsequently a 
view on discretion as research object is constructed, based on approaches from those 
disciplines. Then, in the fourth section, empirical street-level bureaucracy research is 
addressed. The ways discretion has been conceptualized get attention, and leads on to 
suggestions for the analysis of discretion in comparative street-level bureaucracy 
research. The article ends with a conclusion. 
 
 
2. Theoretical views on discretion  
 
2.1 A juridical view on discretion 
 
The uses of discretion, edited by Hawkins (1992a, p. v), takes as its point of departure 
the view that discretion – ‘an elusive concept’ - has been given attention by lawyers 
and social scientists, in relative isolation from each other. Hawkins (1992b, p. 13) 
points out that he has brought perspectives from law and social science together, 
aware that he is using the latter term ‘in a general way to embrace often very disparate 
work by sociologists, political scientists, economists, organizational theorists and 
others’. It seems relevant to identify substantively the ‘disparate’ character of that 
work. Here this will be done by characterizing separately juridical, economic, 
sociological, and political views on discretion.  
 
Hawkins (1992a, p. v) states that those who work in jurisprudence and administrative 
law have addressed discretion while being concerned with ‘decision-making 
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procedures and the scope for the play of individual judgment afforded within a 
structure of rules’; (..) also with the nature of discretionary power, with the ways in 
which official authority is used, and with questions of legitimacy’. While ‘law is 
fundamentally an interpretive enterprise’, discretion, as the translation of rule into 
action, is inevitable (Hawkins 1992b, p. 11). There are three points here: 
 
- ‘(T)he use of rules involves discretion, while the use of discretion involves 
rules’ (ibid., p. 12).  
- ‘Discretion is heavily implicated in the use of rules: interpretative behaviour is 
involved in making sense of rules, and in making choices about the relevance 
and use of rules’ (ibid., p. 13).  
- ‘Discretion – which might be regarded as the space, as it were, between legal 
rules in which legal actors may exercise choice – may be formally granted, or 
it may be assumed’ (ibid., p. 11).  
 
Legal philosophers are concerned with the extent to which rules authorize 
discretionary behaviour. As related to a set of rules discretion occurs ‘when someone 
is in general charged with making decisions, subject to standards set by a particular 
authority’ (Dworkin 1977, p. 31, quoted by Hawkins 1992b, p. 13). Hawkins observes 
distinctions made in the legal-philosophical literature like the ones between weak and 
strong discretion (Dworkin 1977), formal and informal discretion (Goodin 1986), and 
between discretion as subjective justice and rules as formal justice (Handler 1986). 
Legal scholars tend to think about discretion ‘as if it were not only a property of 
individual behaviour, but also essentially rule-guided, as if legal decisions were the 
product of individual knowledge, reflection and reasoning‘ (Hawkins 1992b, p. 18). 
 
 
2.2 An economic view on discretion 
 
Economists share a world view in which the homo economicus is central. Unlike the 
study of law with its focus on formal rules, discretion as such is not a term used in 
economics. However, in what is called the principal/agent approach a similar 
phenomenon is being analyzed. The term principal refers to the rational actor who 
seeks the maximisation of his (her) interests, aiming at benefits as high and costs as 
low as optimal. He (she) has preferences and makes decisions, being led by the wish 
to arrive at a ‘rational choice’.   
 
This approach has been adopted and adapted in policy analysis by researchers from 
outside economics (see, for instance, McCubbins et al. 1984, 1987; Bendor et al. 
2001; Waterman and Meier 1998; for an application to supervision and compliance, 
see Brehm and Gates 1994). Being aware that other actors may be useful to realize his 
preferences, the principal seeks an agent. The choice of the agent must be functional 
to the realization of the interests of the principal. The problem of trust is addressed in 
terms of adverse selection. When the agent works in the name of the principal, their 
relationship is characterized by information a-symmetry. Because the behaviour of the 
agent cannot be completely supervised, the principal makes a claim to the loyalty of 
the agent. However, even when monitoring procedures have been designed, control of 
the agent by the principal remains a risk (moral hazard). 
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It is in this context that ‘compliance’, respectively, ‘deviance’ or ‘divergence’ become 
issues. The actions of the agent are supposed to be functional to realizing the 
preferences of the principal. Although their relationship is a hierarchical one, there are 
limits to direct control. Apart from the indicated information a-symmetry the agent is 
a rational actor as well, acting in a calculating way. Therefore the principal will invest 
in institutionalizing and using a range of ex ante and ex post controls. For the ‘agency 
preference’ of the principal it is important to suppose that agents will do more ‘their 
best’ with decisions close to their own preferences; ‘bureaucratic preferences’ are a 
phenomenon to reckon with (Gains and John 2010).  
 
 
2.3 A sociological view on discretion 
 
Within sociology discretion gets attention - although under varying headings – in 
organizational sociology. Authors like Gouldner (1954), Blau (1955), Simon (1957) 
and Merton (1957) have encountered the context-setting rather than predetermining 
role of administrative and organizational rules. They all have, by implication, 
acknowledged the limits to direct control of organizational behaviour. 
 
Authors like Freidson (1970) make a case of contrasting ‘profession’ and 
‘bureaucracy’ as having, respectively, freedom (autonomy) and being constrained 
(discretion). Others have criticised such contrast as being rhetorical rather than 
empirical, certainly in health care (see Exworthy and Halford, eds 1999; Dickinson 
and Mannion, eds 2012).  
 
Furthermore, the study of street-level bureaucracy itself bears a substantial 
sociological imprint. Exploring administrative discretion from his early work on, Hill 
(1969, 1972), for example, has been approaching processes of social interaction in an 
empirically open way. Also in the successive editions of his textbook on public policy 
he has kept a profiled, sociological, focus on how discretion ‘works’ (Hill 2013). 
Prottas (1979, p. 298) observes: ‘A general rule in the analysis of power is that an 
actor with low ‘compliance observability’ is relatively autonomous. If it is difficult or 
costly to determine how an actor behaves and the actor knows this, then he is under 
less compulsion to comply’. Weatherly (1980, p. 9) states that teachers, and street-
level bureaucrats in general, ‘are certainly responsive to public policy. But their 
activities are also responsive to a number of other influences over which the policy-
maker and administrator may only have limited or no control’ He speaks, rather of a 
‘pyramid-shaped organization’ of an ‘irregularly shaped sphere with vectors of 
different size directed inward’.  
 
While Lipsky (1980) already spoke of ‘alienation’ and ‘coping behaviour’ of street-
level bureaucrats, these typically sociological, respectively, psychological concepts 
since then have got more attention (see, for instance, Tummers 2012). The study of 
representative bureaucracy has focused on the street-level as well, more or less 
directly addressing the question how demographic traits of contact officials influence 
ways of rule application (see, for example, Christensen et al. 2012). 
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2.4 A political view on discretion 
 
While some of the leading exponents of the sociological perspective will consider 
themselves in disciplinary terms as political scientists, we may identify a separate 
‘political’ view. The ‘primacy of politics’ expresses the normative view underlying 
the politics/administration dichotomy (Wilson 1887; Goodnow 1900). What has been 
legitimately decided upon in the institutions of state and democracy, should be 
implemented accordingly. In fact this view is articulated in the stages heuristic of the 
policy process (Anderson 1984).  
 
Next to this meaning of politics as a locus, however, the political can also be used as a 
focus: a particular way of looking at the world. The sources for such a political view 
are various. Among the oldest ones are Aristotle’s Ethics (2004) and Plato’s The 
Republic (1955). In his Ethics Aristotle gives attention to the activities men are 
supposed to perform for the common good, active in the polis. Distinguishing 
between the Market and the Polis as models of society Stone (2002) mentions equity, 
efficiency, security, and liberty as ‘Goals’. In fact, the latter term refers to what is 
being addressed as public values.  
 
The articulation and maintenance of those public values concern a profession, not to 
say a vocation (Weber 1947). As one of the first political scientists, Machiavelli 
(2011) formulated the mechanisms of power, exercised by a public actor. Edelman 
(a.o. 1988) added a macro-perspective to these insights, analyzing political language 
and symbols as used in the ‘political spectacle’. Given the logic of politics, public talk 
and public action do not coincide (for an exemplary case study, see Hood and Dixon 
2012). The competence of combining the substantive and the strategic sides of 
politics, and weighing public values in an accountable way, can be considered to be a 
craft (cf. Sennett 2008). Political-administrative craftsmanship is not reserved for 
actors in a specific locus of the public domain. Practiced however far from the rule-
making institutions, ‘discretionary’ action of public actors, even if not labelled as 
such, requires an adequate use of ‘governance skills’ (Hupe 2011).  
 
 
3. Discretion as a research object 
 
The goal in this article is to specify discretion as a research object. In the previous 
section the juridical view on discretion has been explored, while Hawkins’ general 
label ‘social science’ has been differentiated in, respectively, an economic, 
sociological and political view on discretion. Next, analytical constructions of these 
views can be made, by distinguishing some parameters, in order to enhance 
comparison. That is done in this section by looking at the defining characteristic of 
each of the theoretical views, the sources of discretion, and the type of role the 
discretionary actor is supposed to fulfil; see Table 1. 
 
In the juridical view discretion involves delegated authority. The foundation for 
discretion is situated in legal rules. These rules may have been formulated in laws in a 
literal sense but in fact this applies to all formal rules laid down in public policies. On 
a legitimate basis margins are circumscribed within which a degree of freedom for 
rule application is granted. In the economic view interest representation is central. The 
principal makes a rational choice about how his (her) interests can be realized. The 
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freedom granted to an agent to contribute to this interest representation is checked by 
controls. In the sociological view no formal limits are posed to the freedom of 
judgement. The individual capacity to assess situations in the interaction with clients 
is trusted upon, and seen as, to a certain extent, result of professional training and 
experience. Institutional power struggles may be the result. In the political view on 
discretion the reference point is the pursuit of public values in the name of the 
common good. The exercise of power is functional to this aim.  
 
Table 1. Theoretical views on discretion 
Juridical  Economic  Sociological  Political 
   view  view  view  view 
Defining  Delegated Interest  Freedom of Public values 
characteristic  authority representation judgement via public power 
 
Sources   Formal rules Interests  Judgement Public legitimacy 
       capacity    
 
 
As far as defining characteristics are concerned authority, interests, judgement, and 
values and power indicate varying dimensions of discretion. Next to the juridical 
view, in which rules are central, there stand three ‘social scientific’ views (cf. 
Hawkins). At the same time the juridical and the economic views on discretion jointly 
feature a hierarchical relationship. The latter has a closed, one-to-one, character. For 
the discretionary actor only the rules of the rule maker, respectively, the interests of 
the principal, are supposed to count. Among the four theoretical views, the 
discretionary actor in the sociological view is approached as having the largest 
freedom, in the sense that direct external control by one ‘principal rule maker’ is 
limited. With the ‘primacy of politics’, when politics is approached as a locus, the 
look at discretion bears resemblances with the hierarchical one from the juridical and 
economic perspectives. However, in a view on ‘the political’ as a focus, ‘discretion’ 
takes the form of the ways public actors perform their tasks in the public domain, with 
an orientation to serving the general interest. Under the rule of law, in a democracy, 
they are expected to act on the basis but also within the limits of legitimately granted 
powers.  
 
Hence, in the four theoretical views on discretion the role of the discretionary actor 
varies from rule follower and agent to professional and public actor acting in a 
situation of relative autonomy; see Table 2.  
 
Table 2. The role of the discretionary actor 
Juridical  Economic  Sociological  Political 
   view  view  view   view 
Discretionary role Rule follower Agent  Professional Public actor 
 
Nature of   Prescriptive Prescribed Occupational Desired 
role script  input  output  standards outcome 
 
Role fulfilment   
- Idealtypical ‘By the book’ ‘Taking initiative’ ‘Autonomous’ ‘Legitimate’ 
- Adverse  ‘One-sided’ ‘Limit seeking’ ‘Hard to manage’ ‘Opportunistic’ 
variant  
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While the nature of the roles varies, so do the scripts for each role and, accordingly, 
appropriate role fulfilment. In the juridical view discretion is meant to bring about the 
accomplishment prescribed in the rules concerned. ‘Going by the book’ enhances the 
chance of such accomplishment. It may imply, however, that others than the rule 
maker assess the displayed action by the discretionary actor as one-sided. In the 
economic view discretion is needed to have subordinate others realize specified 
interests. Contracting tasks to an agent involves a loss of control for the principal. For 
the agent the issue is to minimize that control loss. Taking the initiative may be 
functional to realizing the principal’s interests as prescribed outputs – if within limits. 
In the sociological view what is central, irrespective of the degree of formally granted 
authority, is adequate judgement of the situation at hand. The discretionary actor 
fulfils the role in a substantial autonomy, which makes him or her difficult to manage. 
In the political view discretion is instrumental to realizing societally desired 
outcomes, in a direction legitimately decided upon. While this requires the exercise of 
power in a relative autonomy, there is a chance of opportunism. 
 
With discretion as prescriptive input the juridical view is the most predetermining, 
while the sociological view on discretion – not prescribing specified action – is the 
most open. As suggested above already, this also means that the usage of terms like 
‘compliance’, ‘rule bending’, ‘deviation’ or ‘divergence’ is specific. These 
qualifications are connected with the juridical and economic views on discretion, as 
having in common a hierarchical view on the discretionary actor.  
 
 
4. Discretion in street-level bureaucracy research 
 
Although acknowledged as ‘disparate’, Hawkins (1992b) addressed the alternative to 
the juridical view on discretion under the encompassing heading of ‘social science’. 
In the previous two sections this general label has been differentiated, while a range 
of theoretical views on discretion have been explored. Now we address the ways 
discretion is conceptualized in empirical studies on street-level bureaucracy, including 
its connections with other concepts, like rules and autonomy. In particular we will 
look at the consequences to be drawn from the cross-disciplinary exploration. At the 
basis of this section are books and articles from international academic journals on 
street-level bureaucracy, front-line work, and linguistically equivalent terms.  
 
 
4.1 Definitions and sorts of discretion  
 
Distinguishing between ‘policy as written’ and ‘policy as performed’ (p. xvii) Lipsky 
(2010, p. xii) speaks of a ‘paradoxical reality’. On the one hand the work of street-
level bureaucrats is ‘highly scripted’; on the other it requires ‘improvisation and 
responsiveness to the individual’ (ibid.). The term ‘street-level bureaucracy’ itself 
embodies this paradox: ‘How to treat all citizens alike in their claims on government, 
and how at the same time to be responsive to the individual case when appropriate’ 
(ibid.). Lipsky acknowledges that discretion will vary according to the nature of the 
street-level tasks at hand. The greater the degree of discretion, the more salient is such 
an analysis in understanding the character of worker’s behaviour. Although hence 
characterised as a ‘relative concept’, discretion is ‘difficult, if not impossible’ to 
reduce (ibid., p. 15).  
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In the empirical studies on street-level bureaucracy following Lipsky’s classic Davis’ 
(1969, p. 4) definition is often quoted: ‘A public officer has discretion wherever the 
effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses 
of action and inaction’. Stensöta (2012, p. 554-5) defines discretion as ‘the latitude 
that front-line bureaucrats possess to interpret rules when implementing programs, 
making them de facto bureaucratic policymakers’. While Soss et al. (2011, p. i225) 
speak of ‘the discretion possessed by case managers’, Brodkin (2011, p. i272) states: 
‘(D)iscretion involves more than either a simple response-to-incentives or a response-
to-preference. Discretionary choices also derive from specific organizational 
conditions that interact with performance incentives (and preferences) to create a 
street-level calculus of choice’.  
 
Dubois (2010) focuses on roles and identities of welfare workers as created and 
influenced by institutions. Three main points guide Dubois’ (ibid., pp. 3-6) analysis: 
first, the identity and social roles that play a part in the interactions at the desk; 
second, managing tensions and producing consent; maintaining the institutional order, 
and third, the uses and practices of the institution, its functions and their joint 
transformations. ‘Neither impersonal bureaucrats nor standardised clients exist: only 
social agents with individual personalities who, within certain conditions and limits, 
are required to play the role of the impersonal or standardised bureaucrat or client’ 
(ibid., p. 3). The relationship of an individual street-level bureaucrat with the 
institution is ambivalent; it is characterised by ‘both a “social bond” and coercion’ 
(ibid., p. 16).  
 
This has implications for the usage of discretion. Referring to Dupuy and Thoenig 
1985) Dubois (ibid., p. 150) states that street-level bureaucrats ‘make arrangements’. 
‘(T)hey cannot only stick to merely implementing the regulations’ but ‘use their 
discretion and apply the rule according to their interests (Bourdieu 2005)’ (ibid.). In 
the contacts with individual clients this may mean ‘favours and favouritism’, with a 
chance that they ‘bring about discredit and conflict’ (ibid., p. 153). Although, 
however, mistakes can be used as pretexts for complaints, they ‘are usually easily 
accepted at the desk. Injustice rarely leads to scandals’ (ibid., p. 153-4). 
 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, p. 10) refer to Frederickson ‘who reminds us 
that discretion is inherent in all acts of administration’. Rules and supervision do play 
a role, but as a ‘feature of the social terrain that the worker must navigate’ (ibid., p. 
18). Speaking of ‘state-agents’ and ‘citizen agents’ Maynard-Moody and Musheno  
distinguish two ‘narratives of street-level work’. While street-level workers embody 
both, their stories appear to be ‘citizen centered more than rule centered, and the 
workers’ judgments are more moral than legal’ (ibid.). ‘Rather than relying on policy 
to guide so-called discretionary decisions about cases, workers first make judgements 
about the citizen-client and then turn to policy to help enact or, if negative, to 
rationalize their judgements’ (ibid.).     
 
In several studies on street-level bureaucracy sorts of discretion are specified. 
Qualifying labels are, for instance, administrative discretion (Sowa and Coleman 
Selden 2003), bureaucratic discretion (Scott 1997; Keiser and Soss 1998); and front-
line discretion (Ellis 2011). The latter author refers to a distinction made by Taylor 
and Kelly (2006): value discretion, rule discretion and task discretion. Blackmore 
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(2001, p. 147) speaks of informal discretion. ‘Discretionary powers’ is used by 
Riccucci (2005) and Walker and Niner (2005). Furthermore, the distinction between 
objective discretion – related to law to be applied (styles of rule application) and 
subjective discretion – related to managing one’s workload (coping strategies) can be 
found (Winter 2003, p. 8). Riccucci and Meyers (2004, p. 592) describe their measure 
of workers’ discretion as constructed by ‘summing answers to a series of questions 
about whether their decisions are controlled largely by agency rules (low discretion) 
or by the exercise of professional judgement (high discretion)’.   
 
Evans’ (2010) writes about ‘professional discretion’ as exercised by, particularly, 
professional social workers in management roles. While considering discretion ‘a 
difficult idea to pin down’ he (ibid., p. 2) he argues that one should avoid definitional 
debates about a concept like this. He quotes Smith (1981), who looks at ‘(…) the 
language of discretion in relation to the action of discretion’, and adds ‘As a topic, 
discretion is concerned with the extent of freedom a worker can exercise in a specific 
context and the factors that give rise to this freedom in that context’. De jure 
discretion is about ‘the authority to act, the official recognition of a right or 
entitlement to decide, such as professional discretion’. De facto discretion refers to 
‘having the power to act, though not necessarily officially recognised’. It can be 
associated with ‘a capacity to act because of the absence of effective control’ (ibid., p. 
33). 
 
Three ‘regimes of discretion within managerialised social services’ are distinguished 
by Evans, each with a different characterisation of discretion (Table 3.1., p. 66). Next 
to the regimes labelled ‘dominant managerialism’ (discretion undesirable and severely 
constrained) and ‘street-level bureaucracy’ (discretion widespread, necessary but also 
problematic), Evans puts forward ‘discursive managerialism’. In the latter 
perspective, ‘practitioner discretion is contingent upon local circumstances and draws 
on a range of resources and alliances specific to locations. It shares the street-level 
bureaucracy perspective’s view of the possibility of de facto discretion, but also 
points to the possibility of professional discourse as a resource in creating 
discretionary space’ (Evans 2010, p. 153). Evans (ibid., p. 151) refers to Evetts (2002) 
who has argued that ‘the idea of discretion as autonomy – that is absolute freedom – is 
a myth: discretion is freedom within constraints’.  
 
Comparing welfare administration in the USA, Germany and Sweden Jewell (2007) 
observes ‘three worlds of social welfare’. He tries to link ‘macro-’ and ‘micro-’ 
analysis by connecting ‘national culture, institutional history, and agency organization 
to ground-level practice’ (ibid., p. 34). Micro-level differences may, in a ‘nested’ way, 
be related to system differences, resulting in varying regulatory environments. 
Addressing ‘welfare caseworker behaviour’ and ‘activation caseworker behaviour’ as 
dependent variables Jewell places them in context. Across different institutional 
settings discretion may vary not only as it is used (micro) but as it is granted (macro) 
as well. 
 
 
4.2 The discretionary actor and autonomy 
 
While Lipsky focuses on the individual street-level bureaucrat as the discretionary 
actor, sometimes the discretion of the individual public functionary as either manager 
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or operator is addressed (Kelly 1994). Evans (2011, 2012) looks at the discretion of 
professionals as managers. Doing the latter is not taken for granted. Weissert (1994, p. 
245) observes differing perceptions of discretion: ‘(S)ome office directors and 
assistants had difficulty in applying the term to caseworkers. (…) Worker discretion 
has been overemphasized and manager discretion undervalued in previous work’. 
Ringquist (1995), observing discretion as ‘making judgements regarding policy action 
not prescribed in detail by formal rules or legislation’, points out the fact that 
‘discretion can also be exercised by mid-level civil servants (determining acceptable 
civil penalties, determining research designs), upper-level civil servants (setting 
agricultural-loan interest rates, approving operating licenses), and political appointees 
(accepting final administrative rules, setting the discount rate)’ (ibid.: 339).  
 
Scott (1997, p. 37) makes links between discretion on the scale of the organization 
and of the individual. Bureaucratic discretion is viewed as ‘a range of choice within a 
set of parameters that circumscribes the behaviour of the individual service provider. 
These parameters can exist in the form of organizational rules, or they can be 
externally sourced, being grounded in laws or even norms or codes associated with 
professional practice’. Some empirical studies focus on discretion, but not as 
exercised by individuals at the micro-level. Spence (1999), for instance, looks at 
agency discretion, Keiser (1999) at state bureaucratic discretion. 
 
The link made between discretion and rules is ubiquitous. Oberfield (2010) makes a 
distinction between ‘rule followers’ and ‘discretion users’. Speaking of ‘rule-bound 
and discretionary behaviour in bureaucracies’ Walker and Niner (2005, p. 64) support 
Bradshaw’s view (1981) implying that ‘there is a rules/discretion continuum rather 
than any sharp distinction between discretion-based and rule-based organizations. The 
same organization, section and even individual officer seem able to operate 
satisfactorily at different points on the continuum according to the nature of the task 
being undertaken’. 
 
Several authors make a connection with autonomy. Jorg et al. (2005, p. 826), for 
instance, state: ‘Autonomy is defined as the freedom to make discretionary decisions’ 
(see also Ballou 1998 and Batey and Lewis 1982). Sosin (2010, p. 381) observes: 
‘Autonomy toward clients frequently is referred to as organizational discretion: the 
ability of organizational members to act independently from the demands of 
authorities’. Often the concept of autonomy is used in relation to an occupation. 
Bundt (2000, p. 775) looks at the autonomy of librarians as professionals while Smith 
and Meier (1994, p. 556) find that: ‘Far from restricting the autonomy of teachers, 
bureaucrats can free them from administrative responsibilities and allow them to 
concentrate on what they do best – teach. (..)’.  
 
Often the concept of autonomy is used in relation to the level of an organization, like 
Verschuere (2007) does. In a study of the bureaucratic autonomy of some American 
executive agencies Carpenter (2001) makes a sharp distinction, relevant here. For him 
discretion is part of a contractual arrangement, given to an agency in a statute, as 
leeway to interpret and enforce a law within certain bounds. Bureaucratic autonomy, 
on the other hand, ‘is external to a contract and cannot be captured in a principal-
agent relationship’ (ibid., p. 17). ‘(T)he key prerequisite for autonomy is bureaucratic 
reputation’ (ibid.). Huber and Shipan (2002) approach discretion and autonomy as 
related concepts. Their book is about ‘the institutional foundations of bureaucratic 
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autonomy’ (subtitle), while they treat the ‘level of discretion in statutes’ as the 
dependent variable (ibid., 218). 
 
 
4.3 Discretion in context 
 
Dependent or independent variable. The general usage of the term in street-level 
bureaucracy research makes it look as if ‘discretion’ has a uniform meaning. In fact, it 
has not. Some studies in which a distinction between sorts of discretion is made, 
indicate that the term refers to two different empirical phenomena. In one meaning, 
discretion stands for the degree of freedom as prescriptively granted by a rule maker 
to an actor supposed to apply the rules from the latter. This ‘granting’ can happen 
more or less deliberately. It is sometimes expressed as ‘the preferences of politicians’ 
(Huber and Shipan 2002, p. 24), but does not always have to be a matter of ‘rational 
choice’. In an alternative meaning the same term discretion refers to the ways granted 
freedom is actually being used. The focus is on behaviour, in a given setting. Mostly 
it is the behaviour of individual actors at the street level that is looked at. 
 
All street-level bureaucracy researchers share a focus on discretion-as-used. They 
also acknowledge, to a larger or smaller degree, the influence of the discretion granted 
in a specific policy statute, as a relative one. Hence the usage of the same term for 
both phenomena hides in fact a rather fundamental difference in meaning. On one 
hand the term discretion refers to a determinant of output and thus regards an 
independent variable, on the other to empirical variation in behaviour which needs to 
be explained. Then discretion is a dependent variable.  
 
Now it becomes possible to formulate some definitions. When the term rules is 
reserved for action prescriptions from a formal rule maker, discretion can be seen as 
granted – deliberately or not - freedom to act within limits prescribed in a given set of 
rules. Discretionary authority is the freedom to act within prescribed limits, as granted 
by a legitimate rule maker. As such this authority may be exercised by a variety of 
actors, on a range of layers; it is not a prerogative of the individual public servant at 
the street-level. In contrast to discretion as described in rules, the way freedom is used 
refers to actual behaviour of actors. If the latter is the empirical object, it seems 
sensible to use a corresponding conceptualization. Also autonomy is a characteristic 
of an actor. More precisely, autonomy concerns the freedom of actors to pursue their 
own sustained course of action as accepted by relevant others on the basis of a 
reputation for expertise and appropriate task fulfilment (cf. elements adopted from 
Carpenter 2001). 
 
A multi-dimensional theoretical approach. Discretion is a broad term, which has 
multiple meanings. In street-level bureaucracy research the term discretion, unless 
specified, seems to function as a general label for what needs explanation. With that 
character it is in the company of similar umbrella concepts authors have come up with 
in their quest to capture the unspecified ‘rest’: practice beyond expressed intentions. 
As such the concept looks interchangeable with other grand terms employed in 
research to designate what happens in the ‘later’ parts of policy processes. In those 
parts, ‘after a bill has become a law’ (Bardach 1977), so much takes place, that 
researchers have tried out a range of umbrella labels for addressing varying aspects in 
this process as their empirical object. Examples are administration in the 
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politics/administration dichotomy, implementation in the stages picture of the policy 
process, but also performance, a concept prevalent in the contemporary study of 
public management (cf. Walker et al. 2010). These different terms have in common 
that they are used as a general label for what in fact entails a variety of activities 
(forms of action), practiced by different actors, at a range of action spots. 
 
However the degree of specification of the term discretion, in most empirical studies 
on street-level bureaucracy the primary focus actually appears to be on observed or 
self-reported rather than presupposed behaviour. Probably both as a cause and 
consequence of that fact, the imprint of the sociological view on the scholarly theme 
as a whole, is clear. It has led to a diversification of insights on what happens in the 
practice of bureaucracies at the street level. At the same time, a full understanding 
(Verstehen) of ‘what happens’ there, as well as an explanation of empirical variation, 
cannot do without the aspects central in the theoretical views of the other three 
disciplines.  
 
The sociological view points at processes of social interaction within and at the 
borders of organizations. The economic view draws attention to issues about control 
over agents in contexts of divergent interests and the transaction costs involved. The 
political view focuses on questions about legitimacy. And the juridical view clearly 
points out the interplay between rules and discretion. All these aspects are important. 
Also in a ‘bottom-up’ analysis of social interaction the possible occurrence of interest-
driven behaviour (cf. the homo economicus) cannot be overlooked. The working of 
power mechanisms and the prevalence of particular values in the public sphere 
indicate the relevance of the political view (cf. Brodkin’s 1990 ‘policy politics’). And 
in the end, even in a ‘horizontal’ (cf. ‘citizen-agent’) view the fact has to be 
acknowledged that street-level activities of public servants involve delegated 
authority ‘vertically’ exercised in the name of the state. 
 
When explaining what happens at the street level of that state is the objective, all four 
discipline-bound questions and subsequently highlighted issues are relevant. The 
problem of ‘too many variables’ (Goggin 1986), the fact that we do not know much 
yet about the relative weight of factor clusters, as well as practical constraints for 
doing research, leave the ideal of a more comprehensive analysis aside. It is a greater 
explanatory potential that is aimed at when making a case for a multi-dimensional 
theoretical approach of discretion. 
 
Contextualization. The ways in which discretion as granted differs can be expected to 
have a substantial impact on the variation in the ways discretion is used. As Jewell 
(2007, p. 188) observes, behaviour of street-level bureaucrats will vary, due ‘to 
differences in a variety of institutional influences that impact their work’. Taking the 
characteristics of legal and public-administrative systems and other institutional 
factors, like administrative culture, into account can shed a differentiated light on the 
role of discretion. Even if the consultation of peers, indicated in the quote in the 
Introduction, can be expected to be a more or less universal phenomenon, its 
frequency will vary across settings. In France, where the quote comes from, discretion 
to specify broad regulatory rules, is a more common feature than, for instance, in 
Germany. Here, by contrast, usually more detailed specifications are made in the laws 
themselves. The use of discretion is then structured via prescriptions in particular 
administrative procedures. For research this implies the need to specify the rules 
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involved, as well as their sources. Also the nature of control by and the conceptions of 
the rule makers behind the law or policy-on-paper are to be taken into account. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The analytical and political consequences for the study of government put on the 
agenda by Lipsky’s book are still being dealt with (Brodkin 2012). Inasmuch as the 
policy process, and particularly its implementation part ‘at the street level’, 
empirically represents a continuation of the political process, the normative 
consequences of observations like the ones above are substantial. Given the scope of 
this article these have been left aside. The focus has not been on ‘what should happen’ 
but on ‘what happens’.  
 
Obviously the texts of laws and public policies do not automatically predict the literal, 
direct and comprehensive pursuit of the expressed intentions in the practice of their 
implementation. Hence it is this that needs research attention to begin with. Since the 
1970s such attention is given in implementation research, as a subfield of Political 
Science and Public Administration (cf. Hill and Hupe 2009). Taking the comparative 
nature of street-level bureaucracy and, subsequently, the issue of generalization 
seriously implies approaching discretion in a specified way, as a multi-faceted 
concept. Most of all discretion is to be analyzed in its context.  
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